Vestis: route density is only a moat when service execution converts it into cash

Executive summary

Vestis looks like the kind of business that ought to be durable. It supplies uniforms, mats, towels, linens, restroom products, first-aid supplies, and other workplace necessities to more than 300,000 customer accounts in the United States and Canada. Its drivers make more than 3,300 pickup and delivery routes through a network of over 325 facilities. Service is typically weekly, primarily governed by multi-year contracts, and 95% of fiscal 2025 revenue came from the recurring rental business. Those are the raw ingredients of a local-density moat.¹

They are not proof that Vestis has one.

Fiscal 2025 revenue was approximately $2.7 billion, but operating income was only $64.4 million, or 2.4% of revenue. The company reported a $40.2 million net loss and only $64.2 million of operating cash flow. Net income had already fallen from $213.2 million in fiscal 2023 to $21.0 million in fiscal 2024 before becoming negative in fiscal 2025. Whatever structural advantages exist in the route network are not currently translating into robust reported economics.¹

That distinction is the heart of the Vestis case:

• Fact: Vestis has recurring revenue, contracted relationships, substantial route infrastructure, and national scale.
• Interpretation: These features create the opportunity for a moat, not the moat itself.
• Fact: Fiscal 2025 operating profitability, net income, and cash generation were weak.
• Interpretation: The immediate bottleneck appears to be operational conversion—retaining customers, serving routes efficiently, controlling plant and product costs, and turning network density into incremental contribution.
• Fact: Vestis competes with Cintas, UniFirst, regional and local operators, and customers that perform some services in-house.¹
• Interpretation: The network does not confer monopoly economics. A poorly operated incumbent can lose the benefit of density one dissatisfied stop at a time.

The durable investment question is therefore not whether uniform rental is recurring. It plainly is. The question is whether Vestis can make each local service territory behave like a dense, reliable route franchise rather than an expensive collection of plants, trucks, garments, and contractual obligations.

The available evidence is sufficient to publish an industry and business-quality analysis, but not to establish a valuation conclusion. The source packet contains no market price, enterprise value, management forecast, normalized free-cash-flow estimate, or adequately detailed turnaround bridge. Vestis should therefore be treated here as a conditional operational-improvement thesis, not as a demonstrated compounder or a price-specific investment recommendation.

Thesis in one sentence

Uniform rental can generate defensible local economics when recurring contracts, switching friction, and route density reinforce one another—but Vestis’s fiscal 2025 results show that infrastructure density without consistent execution can become trapped fixed cost rather than economic power.

Industry mechanics

The product is availability, not clothing

A uniform-rental provider does more than sell garments. It maintains a circulating inventory, collects used items, launders or processes them, replaces damaged pieces, reconciles wearer counts, and returns the right products on a predictable schedule. The same operating system can carry mats, towels, linens, restroom supplies, and safety products.

Fact: Vestis serves customers on a recurring basis, typically weekly, and primarily through multi-year contracts. It operates over 325 sites, including laundry plants, satellite plants, distribution centers, and manufacturing plants, supported by a fleet serving more than 3,300 pickup and delivery routes.¹

Interpretation: The customer is outsourcing a small but persistent operational workflow. The value proposition is not that Vestis owns uniquely valuable shirts or floor mats. It is that the customer does not have to procure, track, clean, replace, and redistribute them.

This makes reliability part of the product. A missed delivery, incorrect wearer allocation, poor garment quality, or unresolved invoice dispute may impose little physical damage, but it breaks the operating promise. The industry’s apparent simplicity therefore hides a large coordination problem.

Route density is the central production function

A route business has two different kinds of scale:

1. Corporate scale: purchasing, manufacturing, systems, administration, and national-account coverage.
2. Local density: the number and quality of revenue-producing stops that can be served from a particular plant and route structure.

Corporate scale can improve input costs and support large customers. Local density determines whether a driver and truck spend the day generating revenue or moving between sparse stops.

Fact: Vestis has more than 300,000 customer accounts and over 3,300 pickup and delivery routes across the United States and Canada.¹

Interpretation: The economically relevant network is not one continent-wide network. It is a portfolio of local service cells. A dense route in one metropolitan area does not make a distant, underloaded route more profitable. National totals can consequently conceal large differences in local route quality.

The route-density flywheel should work as follows:

1. More customers in a territory add stops and volume.
2. Existing route and plant capacity is utilized more fully.
3. Unit service cost falls, or service frequency and quality improve.
4. The operator can reinvest in sales, products, and retention.
5. Better service and broader coverage attract more customers.

But the flywheel can reverse:

1. Service failures cause account or wearer losses.
2. A route retains much of its labor, vehicle, and travel burden while carrying less revenue.
3. Lower utilization reduces contribution.
4. Cost cutting damages service further.
5. Additional customers leave, making the remaining network still less efficient.

This is why customer retention is not merely a sales metric in route-based services. It is a capacity-utilization variable.

Recurring revenue is not automatically recurring profit

Fact: The recurring rental business produced 95% of Vestis’s fiscal 2025 revenue; direct sales produced the remaining 5%.¹

Fact: Vestis says the business is contracted and recurring, but its risk disclosures also state that customer workforce reductions can reduce the number of employees using uniform services.¹

Interpretation: Recurrence stabilizes the timing of customer contact, but it does not eliminate volume sensitivity. A customer may remain under contract while its wearer count declines. Revenue quality therefore depends on several layers:

• whether the account remains a customer;
• how many employees or facilities the customer has;
• which products each location takes;
• whether prices recover labor, garment, energy, and supply costs;
• whether service credits, replacement expense, or operational failures consume the apparent revenue stability.

The useful analytical distinction is between contract recurrence and economic recurrence. A contract makes another invoice likely. It does not guarantee that the invoice earns an attractive return.

The bottleneck sits at the interface between the route and the customer

Vestis possesses substantial physical infrastructure. The fiscal 2025 results suggest that simply owning the infrastructure is not the scarce capability.

Interpretation: The likely bottleneck is the operating system that coordinates frontline service, route design, account retention, garment inventory, plant throughput, pricing, and issue resolution. This is where corporate scale must be translated into local density and customer trust.

That has two investment implications:

• A turnaround cannot be judged solely by headquarters cost reductions. Removing overhead may improve reported expense, but it does not necessarily repair route economics.
• The most valuable improvement would be one that simultaneously raises retention, route utilization, service reliability, and cash conversion. These variables should reinforce rather than trade off against one another.

Business model and economics

Revenue architecture

Vestis provides:

• uniform rental programs;
• mats, towels, and linens;
• restroom supplies;
• first-aid and safety products;
• direct-sale customized uniforms;
• contamination-control garments and supplies for controlled environments.

Its customers span manufacturing, hospitality, retail, food processing, pharmaceuticals, healthcare, and automotive, ranging from single-location businesses to national companies and franchises.¹

This diversity reduces dependence on one customer industry, but it does not remove macroeconomic exposure. Many programs ultimately scale with employment, facility activity, or customer production.

Cost architecture

The disclosed operating footprint points to a cost base involving:

• route labor and vehicles;
• laundry and processing facilities;
• garment and product procurement;
• replacement inventory;
• manufacturing and distribution;
• energy, water, and other plant inputs;
• sales and customer-service labor;
• corporate systems and overhead.

Fact: Vestis employed approximately 18,150 people in fiscal 2025. Its network included over 325 facilities and more than 3,300 pickup and delivery routes. It also operated two Mexican manufacturing facilities that produced approximately 60% of its uniforms.¹

Interpretation: Much of this cost base is adjustable eventually but not frictionlessly. A route can lose volume before its miles, driver hours, or supporting plant costs can be redesigned. The same operating leverage that can improve margins as density rises can damage margins when retention or volume weakens.

Working capital and cash conversion

Uniform rental is not a pure asset-light subscription. The provider must fund garments, processing assets, vehicles, facilities, and replacement cycles before collecting the full stream of customer payments.

Fact: Vestis reported $64.2 million of operating cash flow in fiscal 2025, compared with $471.8 million in fiscal 2024 and $257.0 million in fiscal 2023. Fiscal 2025 cash and cash equivalents were $29.7 million.¹

Interpretation: Fiscal 2025 cash generation does not support a claim that Vestis’s recurring revenue currently produces subscription-like cash economics. The large year-to-year movement also means that net income alone is an inadequate performance measure. A serious turnaround assessment needs a bridge covering working capital, garment investment, restructuring cash costs, capital expenditure, and other non-recurring items.

What good economics would look like

The correct test is not merely revenue growth. A healthy route-density model should eventually show:

• stable or improving customer retention;
• positive organic growth not dependent entirely on price;
• improving route revenue or gross profit per service hour;
• plant utilization gains;
• fewer service failures and credits;
• margin expansion accompanied by—not achieved at the expense of—retention;
• operating cash flow that converts into durable free cash flow after required garment and infrastructure investment.

The available packet does not provide all of those measures. Their absence is itself important: reported revenue recurrence should not be used as a substitute for evidence about customer and route health.

Seven Powers assessment

Hamilton Helmer’s Seven Powers framework helps distinguish a structurally attractive business from one that merely looks large.

Power	Vestis assessment	Evidence and interpretation
Scale economies	Potentially meaningful, not currently proven in returns	Vestis has national purchasing, manufacturing, facilities, and route scale. But fiscal 2025’s 2.4% operating margin indicates that scale was not translating into strong reported profitability.1
Network economies	Weak as a classic network effect; meaningful as local density	One customer does not directly make the service more valuable to another. Additional nearby stops can improve route economics, but that is a supply-side density effect rather than a demand-side network effect.
Counter-positioning	No supported evidence	The packet does not identify a business model that incumbents cannot copy without damaging their existing economics.
Switching costs	Moderate and operational	Multi-year contracts, wearer setup, garment allocation, delivery routines, and service integration plausibly create friction. But the presence of national, regional, local, and in-house alternatives limits how far this can be taken.
Branding	Possible trust benefit, but not established as pricing power	Reliability and national coverage may matter to procurement teams. The packet provides no evidence that Vestis’s brand independently commands superior pricing or retention.
Cornered resource	None established	Plants, routes, garments, labor, and manufacturing capacity are costly to assemble but are not shown to be exclusive resources.
Process power	The decisive possibility, but currently unproven	Superior route design, plant operations, inventory control, and service recovery could compound over time. Fiscal 2025 performance does not establish that Vestis currently possesses such a superior operating process.

The analysis points to a narrow conclusion: Vestis’s most credible sources of power are local scale economies, switching friction, and potentially process power. All three depend on execution. None permits the analyst to infer a moat merely from recurring revenue or network size.

Porter’s Five Forces

Rivalry among existing competitors: high

Fact: Vestis identifies Cintas and UniFirst as notable competitors and also competes against numerous regional and local providers.¹

Interpretation: Rivalry operates locally as well as nationally. National scale may be important for multi-location customers, but smaller providers can still compete within individual territories. Service quality and price are visible dimensions of competition, making operational inconsistency dangerous.

Threat of new entrants: moderate

A new national network would require substantial facilities, routes, systems, inventory, and customer acquisition. That creates a real entry barrier.

The barrier is lower at the local level. A regional operator can build density incrementally without reproducing Vestis’s entire footprint. Existing local competitors also need not enter; they are already present.

Conclusion: Entry is difficult at full national scale but more feasible within selected local markets or niches.

Buyer power: moderate to high

Vestis serves a broad range of customers. Small customers may have limited individual negotiating leverage, while large regional and national accounts can solicit competitive bids and demand consistent service across locations.

Operational switching friction moderates buyer power, but it does not eliminate it. Customers can also bring parts of the workflow in-house.

Supplier power: moderate

Vestis operates two Mexican manufacturing facilities that produce approximately 60% of its uniforms, which may give it more control over a major input than a pure reseller would have.¹

However, labor, energy, vehicles, textiles, and other products remain important inputs. Vestis explicitly warns that labor costs, labor shortages, materials inflation, supply disruptions, tariffs, and other economic factors may raise costs faster than pricing can recover them.¹

Threat of substitutes: moderate

The principal substitute is not a technological disruption. It is customer self-performance: buying garments or supplies directly and managing cleaning, replacement, and distribution internally.

Outsourcing should remain attractive where customers value convenience, compliance, cleanliness, branding, or predictable service. But customers can unbundle parts of the offering or reduce program scope when budgets tighten.

Management and ownership

The source packet supports only a limited management and ownership assessment.

Supported facts:

• Vestis completed its separation from Aramark on September 30, 2023.
• Its shares began regular-way trading on the New York Stock Exchange under the ticker VSTS on October 2, 2023.
• The company was therefore an independent public company for only part of the financial history included in the packet.¹
• A January 8, 2026 definitive proxy statement is listed in the SEC filing inventory, but the packet does not include its ownership tables, compensation disclosures, director biographies, or shareholder proposals.

Interpretation:

A recent spin-off can expose costs, incentives, and operational weaknesses that were obscured inside a larger parent. It can also create an opportunity to redesign systems and accountability. The fiscal 2024 and 2025 deterioration makes management execution central to the thesis, but the bounded evidence does not support a judgment about individual executives, board quality, insider ownership, incentive alignment, or the concentration of institutional ownership.

Before making an investment decision, the management assessment should be completed from the proxy statement and subsequent filings, with particular attention to:

• executive turnover and operating experience;
• incentive metrics and whether they reward retention, cash conversion, and return on invested capital;
• insider ownership and open-market purchases or sales;
• board refreshment following the separation;
• restructuring or transformation targets;
• whether management discloses route-level and customer-health indicators;
• capital-allocation priorities in light of weak cash generation.

No unsupported ownership claim is made here.

Ten-year financial interpretation: what the record can and cannot show

Despite being labeled a ten-year snapshot, the supplied SEC company-facts extract does not contain ten comparable years of Vestis financial results. It includes selected annual observations primarily from fiscal 2022 through fiscal 2025. Moreover, Vestis did not become an independent public company until September 2023.¹

A statistically or economically coherent ten-year trend cannot therefore be reconstructed from this packet. Treating the available observations as a full cycle would create false precision.

Available financial record

Fiscal period end	Net income (loss)	Operating cash flow	Cash	Assets	Equity	Diluted shares
2021-10-01	Not supplied	Not supplied	Not supplied	Not supplied	$2.332 billion	Not supplied
2022-09-30	$141.7 million	$232.8 million	Not supplied	Not supplied	$2.336 billion	130.725 million
2023-09-29	$213.2 million	$257.0 million	$36.1 million	$3.157 billion	$877.4 million	130.725 million
2024-09-27	$21.0 million	$471.8 million	$31.0 million	$2.932 billion	$903.1 million	131.787 million
2025-10-03	$(40.2) million	$64.2 million	$29.7 million	$2.907 billion	$865.6 million	131.751 million

Source: SEC company-facts observations reproduced in the source packet. The packet attributes overlapping comparative observations to later filings; they should not be mistaken for a complete pre-spin standalone history.

What can be inferred

1. Reported earnings deteriorated sharply. Net income increased between the supplied fiscal 2022 and 2023 observations, then fell to $21.0 million in fiscal 2024 and became a $40.2 million loss in fiscal 2025.

2. Cash generation was volatile rather than steadily compounding. Operating cash flow rose to $471.8 million in fiscal 2024 but fell to $64.2 million in fiscal 2025. The packet does not provide enough detail to determine how much of the fiscal 2024 strength or fiscal 2025 weakness came from working capital, separation-related items, restructuring, or underlying operations.

3. The equity discontinuity requires care. Reported equity fell from approximately $2.3 billion in the supplied pre-spin observations to $877.4 million at fiscal 2023. Because the separation occurred at the end of fiscal 2023, this should not be interpreted as an ordinary operating loss without tracing the separation accounting and capital structure.

4. Share count was comparatively stable in the supplied post-spin observations. Diluted weighted-average shares were 131.8 million in fiscal 2024 and 131.8 million in fiscal 2025 when rounded to one decimal place. The available record does not indicate major recent dilution, but it is too short to support a durable capital-allocation judgment.

5. The latest year is inconsistent with a proven compounder. Fiscal 2025 operating income of $64.4 million, a 2.4% operating margin, a net loss, and $64.2 million of operating cash flow indicate that the business was not converting its scale and recurring revenue into attractive reported economics.¹

What cannot be inferred

The supplied history cannot establish:

• a ten-year organic revenue growth rate;
• normalized operating or free-cash-flow margins;
• through-cycle return on invested capital;
• historical customer retention;
• route-level productivity;
• maintenance versus growth capital expenditure;
• the sustainable effect of separation costs;
• normalized leverage or debt-service capacity;
• management’s success relative to a credible pre-spin baseline.

The honest ten-year conclusion is therefore negative but useful: there is not enough comparable standalone history to call Vestis a durable compounder, and the recent independent record raises rather than resolves the operating-quality question.

The turnaround equation

A Vestis turnaround should be evaluated as a linked operating equation:

customer retention × revenue per retained stop × route density × plant productivity × price-cost discipline = cash contribution

Improving only one term may not create durable value.

• Price increases without service quality can raise churn.
• Route cuts without account triage can weaken density.
• headcount reductions without process redesign can worsen delivery errors.
• Sales growth into poorly designed routes can add revenue without adequate contribution.
• Working-capital harvesting can temporarily improve cash while underinvestment damages future service.

The strongest evidence of improvement would be simultaneous progress in customer retention, organic volume, route productivity, operating margin, and cash conversion. If management reports only adjusted earnings while operating cash flow and customer health remain weak, the density thesis has not been validated.

Risks

1. Service deterioration can unwind density

A route network benefits from clustered customers, but losing stops can leave labor, plant, and vehicle costs behind. Service problems can therefore produce nonlinear economic damage: lower retention reduces density, which raises cost per stop and makes service recovery harder.

2. Weak economics may be structural rather than temporary

The attractive industry narrative does not prove that Vestis’s territories, customer contracts, or facilities are configured well enough to earn high returns. Fiscal 2025’s 2.4% operating margin may reflect fixable execution, but it could also expose structurally weaker local positions or unfavorable contracts.¹

3. Employment and customer-activity sensitivity

Vestis warns that economic weakness can cause customers to reduce workforces, restrict spending, or cease operations. Fewer customer employees can reduce uniform-service volumes even if the customer relationship continues.¹

4. Labor and input inflation

The company is exposed to labor costs and shortages, garment and material costs, energy, supply-chain disruptions, tariffs, and other inflationary pressures. Vestis states that it may not be able to recover all higher costs through pricing.¹

5. Contract quality can differ from contract duration

Multi-year contracts improve visibility, but duration alone says little about pricing escalators, service obligations, termination rights, credits, garment commitments, or account-level profitability. A long contract can preserve weak economics as readily as strong economics.

6. Competition limits recovery options

Cintas, UniFirst, regional providers, local operators, and in-house alternatives constrain pricing and create destinations for dissatisfied customers.¹ Vestis may need to invest in service before it can retain pricing benefits, delaying margin recovery.

7. Spin-off comparability and execution risk

The separation from Aramark complicates historical comparisons. Standalone systems, overhead, capital structure, and operating accountability may differ from the pre-spin arrangement. Investors risk mistaking accounting discontinuities for operating trends—or dismissing genuine operating deterioration as temporary separation noise.

8. Cash conversion risk

Fiscal 2025 operating cash flow was only $64.2 million.¹ Without a detailed normalization bridge, recurring revenue should not be assumed to produce reliable distributable cash. Garment investment, working capital, capital expenditure, restructuring, and debt service all matter.

9. Balance-sheet and liquidity analysis is incomplete

The packet reports $29.7 million of fiscal 2025 cash but does not provide enough debt, maturity, interest, covenant, or revolver detail for a complete leverage assessment. Any valuation or downside case built without those items would be incomplete.

10. Valuation can overwhelm business improvement

No share price, enterprise value, or consensus expectation is included in the evidence set. Even a successful operating recovery can be a poor investment if already reflected in the price; a weak current business can be attractive if the price implies a sufficiently pessimistic outcome. This note establishes neither condition.

Falsification framework

The route-density thesis would be strengthened by:

• sustained customer-retention improvement;
• organic growth that includes stable or improving wearer and account volumes;
• service improvements preceding or accompanying margin expansion;
• higher route and plant productivity;
• operating cash flow recovering without merely consuming working capital;
• a clear bridge from adjusted earnings to free cash flow;
• evidence that pricing exceeds input inflation without accelerating customer losses;
• credible management incentives tied to cash returns and customer health.

It would be weakened or falsified by:

• continued account or wearer losses despite restructuring;
• margin improvement driven mainly by cuts that damage service;
• repeated reliance on adjusted metrics while cash conversion remains weak;
• persistent inability to recover labor and product inflation;
• facility or route rationalization that fails to improve utilization;
• repeated management target resets without operational disclosure;
• rising leverage or dilution used to fund an operating model that cannot self-finance.

Knowledge-compounding takeaways

1. Local density is a network of micro-monopolies, not one national monopoly

A large route company should be analyzed territory by territory in concept, even when the public disclosures are consolidated. The defensible unit is the local cluster of customers around a service operation. National scale can support those clusters, but it cannot substitute for them.

This mental model carries to pest control, waste collection, propane delivery, home services, less-than-truckload freight, beverage distribution, medical-waste collection, and other scheduled route businesses.

2. Retention is a capacity metric disguised as a customer metric

In recurring route services, losing a customer does more than remove revenue. It can reduce utilization of a driver, vehicle, plant, terminal, or branch. Churn therefore attacks both sides of the income statement.

The reverse is also true: a retained customer can become more profitable as nearby stops are added, even if the customer’s own pricing is unchanged.

3. Recurring revenue and recurring economics are different assets

A contract can recur while volume falls, service costs rise, or capital requirements absorb the cash. Analysts should ask four separate questions:

1. Does the invoice recur?
2. Does the underlying unit volume recur?
3. Does the contribution margin recur?
4. Does the contribution convert into free cash flow?

Only the fourth directly funds shareholder returns.

4. Physical networks possess negative operating leverage before they possess moats

Plants, branches, trucks, and routes are valuable when utilized. When volume weakens, the same network can become stranded overhead. The analytical mistake is to label every large installed network a moat without testing utilization, retention, and incremental returns.

5. Process power is usually the hidden variable in “boring” service businesses

Competitors can buy trucks, garments, software, and laundry equipment. They cannot instantly reproduce thousands of small routines that produce accurate deliveries, efficient routes, low rewash rates, appropriate inventory, fast issue resolution, and disciplined pricing.

That accumulated operating knowledge can become durable process power—but only if it is demonstrably better than competitors’ processes. Vestis’s current results do not yet establish that advantage.

6. Turnarounds should be tested against reinforcing variables

A durable turnaround improves the system rather than one reported line item. In a route business, customer satisfaction, retention, density, labor productivity, margin, and cash conversion should eventually move together. If one improves by cannibalizing the others, the result is harvesting rather than compounding.

7. The strongest moat may belong to the best operator, not the largest footprint

Vestis has a large footprint, but footprint is an input. The economic power belongs to the operator that fills routes, keeps customers, controls replacement and plant costs, and reinvests the resulting cash without degrading service.

Scale amplifies operating quality. It also amplifies operating mistakes.

Bottom line

Vestis operates in an industry with attractive structural ingredients: recurring service, multi-year customer relationships, operational switching friction, local route density, and potential purchasing and manufacturing scale. Its more than 300,000 accounts, 325-plus facilities, and 3,300-plus routes are meaningful assets.¹

But fiscal 2025 demonstrates why those ingredients must not be confused with finished economics. A business producing approximately $2.7 billion of revenue but only a 2.4% operating margin, a $40.2 million net loss, and $64.2 million of operating cash flow has not yet shown that its density translates into durable shareholder returns.¹

The most defensible conclusion is conditional:

Vestis may own the infrastructure for a good route business, but it has not yet demonstrated the operating system of a great one.

That makes the company analytically interesting. The upside case is not that uniforms suddenly become a high-growth product. It is that better retention, route design, service execution, and cash discipline allow an existing physical network to earn returns closer to its structural potential.

Until that conversion is visible in both customer health and cash flow, recurring revenue should be treated as an opportunity—not a verdict.

Source notes

Additional financial observations come from the SEC company-facts snapshot reproduced in the source packet at /Users/hiroyoshisuzuki/Documents/Obsidian Vault/Research/Investment analysis raw/2026-07-19/source-packet.md. The underlying local artifact is /Users/hiroyoshisuzuki/Documents/Obsidian Vault/Research/Investment analysis raw/2026-07-19/raw/sec-companyfacts.json.

The source packet also lists Vestis’s January 8, 2026 definitive proxy statement and February and May 2026 quarterly filings, but it does not reproduce enough of their contents to support claims about named executives, beneficial ownership, compensation design, post-fiscal-2025 operating trends, or updated guidance. Those claims are deliberately omitted.

No market-price, valuation, enterprise-value, debt-maturity, or normalized free-cash-flow evidence was supplied. This note therefore analyzes industry structure and business economics rather than making a price-specific recommendation.

Footnotes

1. Vestis Corporation, fiscal 2025 Form 10-K, filed December 2, 2025, accession no. 0001628280-25-054597: SEC filing. Used for the company overview, fiscal 2025 revenue mix and results, customer and facility counts, route footprint, workforce, competitors, manufacturing footprint, separation history, and risk disclosures. ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶ ↩⁷ ↩⁸ ↩⁹ ↩¹⁰ ↩¹¹ ↩¹² ↩¹³ ↩¹⁴ ↩¹⁵ ↩¹⁶ ↩¹⁷ ↩¹⁸ ↩¹⁹ ↩²⁰ ↩²¹ ↩²² ↩²³ ↩²⁴